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Agent-Based Modeling in Social Science,  
History, and Philosophy. An Introduction 
Dominik Klein, Johannes Marx & Kai Fischbach ∗ 
Abstract: »Agentenbasierte Modelle in den Sozialwissenschaften, Geschichte 
und Philosophie« Agent-based modeling has become a common and well-
established tool in the social sciences and certain of the humanities. Here, we 
aim to provide an overview of the different modeling approaches in current 
use. Our discussion unfolds in two parts: we first classify different aspects of 
the model-building process and identify a number of characteristics shared by 
most agent-based models in the humanities and social sciences; then we map 
relevant differences between the various modeling approaches. We classify 
these into different dimensions including the type of target systems addressed, 
the intended modeling goals, and the models’ degree of abstraction. Along the 
way, we provide reference to related debates in contemporary philosophy of 
science. 
Keywords: Agent-based Modeling, Methodology, Toy Models, Philosophy of 
Modeling. 
1.  Introduction  
Agent-based modeling has become a common and well-established tool in the 
social sciences and certain of the humanities. Broadly speaking, it affords a 
way to study a social, economic, historic, or political phenomenon by examin-
ing the iterated interactions of individuals that give rise to the phenomenon. 
Agent-based models understood in this way are nothing new; Adam Smith’s 
theory of the invisible hand (Smith 2005), first proposed in 1759 and which 
posits that individual self-interested actions may lead to overall social and 
economic benefits as non-intended consequences, bears important features of 
an agent-based model (see also Gavin 2018, in this HSR Special Issue). Much 
more recently, Schelling’s segregation model (1969), which shows that segre-
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gation can occur even within a society of fairly liberal agents, qualifies as an 
agent-based model. The latter has an additional feature: All agents’ behavior is 
specified by explicit mathematical rules, which allows the modeler to execute 
the dynamics of the model herself (on a chessboard, as Schelling invites the 
reader to do). This could, of course, also be done with a computer, giving rise 
to agent-based simulations. 
With the growing availability of personal computers since the late 1980s, a 
worldwide community of scholars has been using simulations for various rea-
sons. Within agent-based modeling, the use of simulation methods is so ubiqui-
tous that “agent-based model” and “agent-based computational model” have 
become synonymous. In fact, we address only computational models herein. 
Agent-based simulations have a number of distinct advantages over other 
methodologies. We point to four. First, simulations allow for numerical solu-
tions of mathematical descriptions of social systems that are not tractable em-
ploying classical means, which is particularly important for agent-based mod-
els, where a large number of possibly heterogeneous agents can have complex 
interactions over an extended period. Second, agent-based models provide a 
way to bridge the micro-macro gap. While social processes are, in general, 
produced through the interaction of individuals, the emergent social patterns 
need not be related to these individual actions in any straightforward way (List 
and Spiekermann 2013). Agent-based models allow to map this micro-macro 
gap and thereby to demystify processes of emergence through scrutinizing the 
supervenience of macroscopic phenomena on micro level processes. By simu-
lating the iterated interactions of agents over time, agent-based models allow 
the re-creation of the relevant processes of emergence step by step. A fortiori, 
by systematically varying individual parameters, agent-based simulations pro-
vide a way to gain a fine-grained understanding of how emergent patterns 
depend upon the exact types of interactions. In some cases, the phenomena of 
interest may be realized in multiple ways at the micro level making them mi-
cro-level robust. In other cases, the realization of the phenomena of interest is 
dependent on the presence of well-defined variables or results from random 
processes. Third, by controlling random effects and input parameters, agent-
based models make it possible to study individual runs of non-deterministic 
processes. Such a degree of precision allows for the discovery and analysis of 
path dependencies and tipping points – phenomena that are ubiquitous in social 
processes, but are extremely difficult to address with classical, statistic means. 
Fourth, agent-based models often come with their own, distinctive representa-
tional tools. For instance, NetLogo, a software packet used for most simula-
tions presented here, provides a graphic interface of the agents’ landscapes that 
develop over time (Wilensky 1999). Such graphic tools have turned out to be 
extremely useful for the presentation and dissemination of simulation results. 
They can also play an important role in the context of discovery, pointing to 
new and unexpected patterns that call for an explanation.  
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Agent-based models have created a number of landmark contributions in 
philosophy and the social sciences. Space allows us to mention only a few. As 
early as 1981, Axelrod employed agent-based modeling to analyze the evolu-
tion of cooperation in collective action dilemmas (Axelrod 1981). In 1996, 
Epstein and Axtell presented their famous Sugarscape model, an agent-based 
social simulation to discuss social dynamics in an artificial society with a focus 
on the emerging distribution of wealth. Hegselmann and Krause (2002) and 
Deffuant et al. (2000) created formal models of belief dynamics showing that 
belief polarization – a pattern often linked to irrational behavior – can occur 
even among rational agents when they are faced with the problem of simulta-
neously determining who to take seriously and how to update their own beliefs. 
The role of high-order beliefs is discussed in Arthur (2006) with the El Farol 
model, named for a famous bar in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Modeling the pa-
trons of said bar and their decisions on whether or not to attend at a given even-
ing Arthur shows how solutions to game theoretic coordination problems can 
arise autonomously, through agents forming higher order beliefs about each 
other. 
Within philosophy of science, two seminal contributions address the social 
and organizational makeup of science and how it influences scientific progress. 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) assess how the parallel existence of two types 
of scientists – mavericks exploring new and risky approaches and followers 
pursuing well-established theories – can advance science to levels that neither 
type alone could have achieved. Zollman (2010), in contrast, comes to the 
somewhat surprising conclusion that impeding scientists from exchanging 
intermediate results may be beneficial for the overall progress of science in the 
long run. 
Until recently, agent-based models in large parts of the social sciences and 
the humanities had barely managed to enter the well-established, mainstream 
journals in their respective disciplines. Rather, agent-based modelers tended to 
“form a community of their own with their own journals and annual meetings,” 
as Hedström and Manzo put it (2015, 180). They published their results in 
specialized journals such as the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simu-
lation or Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory. In main-
stream journals, agent-based models were typically found in special issues 
devoted to the method (e.g., Revue Française de Sociologie 2014, American 
Journal of Sociology 2005). 
The impact of agent-based modeling on the general research in social sci-
ence has traditionally been weak. One reason frequently cited to explain this is 
a discontinuity in methods and perspectives with more mainstream work. For 
one, the theoretical apparatus is non-standard in a variety of research fields. 
This holds especially true for fields such as history and philosophy, in which 
not only programming tools, but also the mathematical language used to ex-
press agents and their behavioral rules are not parts of the traditional toolbox. 
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Moreover, the representation of research problems in agent-based modeling 
differs from much mainstream work in the respective disciplines. Many of the 
agent-based models put forward in philosophy and the social sciences are high-
ly abstract, omitting a variety of possibly relevant features of their target sys-
tems. The focus on abstract and highly idealized models, again, is far from 
standard in many disciplines and hence has contributed to deepening the gap 
between modelers and other practitioners.  
Recently, however, the gap between agent-based modelers and standard 
practices in their broader disciplines seems to be closing. Researchers using 
simulation techniques no longer define themselves as modelers per se but in-
stead refer to agent-based models as a useful tool for puzzle-solving within 
standard scientific discourse. As a result, more and more articles using agent-
based simulations have been published in recent years.  
Figure 1: Number of Articles Indexed in Google Scholar and the Social Science 
Citation Index (Web of Science) with “agent-based model,” “agent-
based modeling,” or “agent-based modelling” in the Title, by Year.1 
 
In light of these developments, we take it to be the right moment for an over-
view of current research in agent-based modeling. With the present HSR Spe-
cial Issue, we aim to present a cross-section of current approaches to agent-
based simulations. By taking stock and comparing the different approaches, our 
goal is to contribute to a deepened understanding of the assumptions, targets, 
opportunities, and pitfalls of agent-based modeling in the social sciences and 
humanities. The papers included in this issue come from a variety of disci-
plines, including history, literature studies, political science, and philosophy. 
                                                             
1  Data sampled in late December 2017. Numbers for 2017 may not be complete, as it typically 
takes some time until papers are included in the databases. 
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Their broad range of purposes includes prediction, explanations of past events 
as well as general patterns, understanding of structural relationships, consisten-
cy checks of pre-formal theories, and, finally, robustness assessments of exist-
ing models. The models presented are aimed at a variety of target systems, 
including singular events in history as well as general event types, but also 
informal theories such as the works of John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. Mod-
els discussed in this issue differ in their degrees of abstraction, ranging from 
empirically calibrated parameters to highly abstract representations. Finally, the 
contributions differ in how they relate to agent-based simulations. Some create 
new models aimed at a particular target system, whereas others apply existing 
models to new targets or discuss the virtues and limitations of earlier models. 
In short, the presented models cover a broad variety of aspects and features 
relevant in current agent-based modeling.  
2.  Characteristic Features of Agent-Based Models 
All the papers contributed to this special issue employ agent-based models for 
their argumentation. By representing the iterated adaptive interactions of 
agents, such models are particularly suitable for analyzing the dynamics of a 
social system. Within a model, the dynamics at the social level is emergent; 
that is, it occurs as the aggregated outcome of iterated interactions between its 
agents, which are the constituent units of the system (Bonabeau 2002). These 
agents can be individuals, organized groups, firms, or even states – indeed, any 
type of entity that owns so-called “actorness,” that is, that forms perceptions of 
its surroundings and has the capacity to engage in autonomous decision-making 
and intentional action.  
Within an agent-based model, social systems are modeled as a set of agents 
located within a suitable space, a set of behavioral rules for the agents and, 
lastly, a mechanism that guides the agents’ interactions, including their actions’ 
feedback on the structure. Thus, the workings of agent-based models can be 
reconstructed with Coleman’s Bathtub, a methodological framework for ex-
plaining how macro-level structures influence micro-level behavior and vice 
versa.2 The Coleman’s Bathtub framework includes all the parts relevant for 
explaining social dynamics through individual interactions (see Figure 2): (1) 
the social structure within which an agent is placed; (2) a mechanism that de-
scribes how social structure impacts individual agents at the micro level; (3) the 
agents, with their perceptions and decision-making capacity; (4) a mechanism 
providing for how agents choose their actions; (5) the actions chosen; (6) a 
transformational mechanism that describes how the agents’ behavior at the 
                                                             
2  For a discussion of the framework and its implications, see Udehn (2001), Hedström (2005).  
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agents, such as the initial allocation of opinions or resources, is a relevant 
macro feature of any model. Finally, the modeler must justify the model-
ing choices. At a minimum, she must provide reasons for her decisions 
regarding which properties to include, the spatial structure chosen, and 
the initial distribution of agents’ properties. Part of this justification is to 
provide a mapping between the formal elements of the model and the so-
cial phenomena they represent. 
2) The framework demands, in a second step, that the modeler provide a 
mechanism to bridge macro and micro level. Such mechanisms can be 
found in all agent-based models and, following Coleman, all explanations 
of social phenomena. Doing computational agent-based modeling forces 
the researcher to code these mechanisms explicitly. For a multi-agent 
model, the modeler must name at least one mechanism to explain how 
features of the social structure (e.g., the distribution of properties of the 
other agents) influence the agents (e.g., in their opinion formation). This 
step is also where the modeler needs to describe whether and how macro-
scopic features such as institutions, rules, or formal and informal norms 
influence the agents in their perceptions and available actions. Examples 
of such are institutional rules that limit the agents’ available set of op-
tions or belief update mechanisms, delineating how the opinions of others 
shape an agent’s mindset. 
3) The agents come into play in the framework’s next step. In social simula-
tions, the agents are typically equipped with a basic form of perception 
and capabilities for learning and autonomous decision-making. Such 
agents may stand for a variety of different actor types, ranging from more 
or less rational agents of everyday life to highly strategic individuals in 
specialized contexts to collective actors such as political parties deciding 
on policy positions (Schmitt and Franzmann 2018). Naturally, the design 
of the agents should fit the intended research goal. If a model simulates 
the dynamic of a mass panic, for instance, it might be adequate to treat 
agents as particles governed by the laws of Newtonian mechanics. When 
explananda are more complex social phenomena, agents should be de-
signed to include relevant features for their behavior in social life. De-
pending on the target phenomenon, memory, learning, and perception 
may all be important. Within a computational model, agents can be het-
erogeneous and may differ in various aspects; they can, for example, be 
of different types, equipped with different attributes, and display different 
behavioral patterns (Bianchi and Squazzoni 2015). Agents can also have 
their own histories of interactions that may guide their future behavior.  
4) The agents’ actions are driven by behavioral rules. Such rules could be to 
select the option that maximizes expected utility or to apply some simpler 
heuristics in line with the concept of bounded rationality. Moreover, 
agents may also be guided by social norms (Gavin 2018) or emotional 
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  14 
and psychological factors. In general, all kinds of economic, sociological, 
or psychological behavioral rules can be applied as long as they allow for 
a formal operationalization. It is part of the modeler’s task to decide on 
and justify behavioral rules for the agents. Notably, agent-based models 
do not require that all agents follow the same behavioral rules. Rather, 
different agents may follow different behavioral policies if that is called 
for by the target domain. The ability to represent heterogeneous popula-
tions, is, in fact, often cited as a major advantage of agent-based models. 
The only restriction applicable is that all rules must be modeled explicitly. 
5) To transform intention into physical action, an agent needs action re-
sources. This seems obvious for human agents, but can be demanding for 
collective agents such as non-governmental organizations or states. 
Hence, a modeler may need to say something about the capacity of 
agents to perform the intended actions and about limitations thereof. 
While often left implicit when modeling individuals, such considerations 
frequently occur in contexts of collective agency. 
6) Performing actions at the micro level generates consequences for the so-
cial structure at the macro level. In the sixth step, an aggregative mecha-
nism is sought to determine how individual actions combine to affect so-
cial outcomes. In some cases, the action of a single person can generate 
enormous effects at the macro level. This, however, is far from usual. In 
most agent-based models, it is only the iteration and accumulation of in-
dividual actions, each with a relatively small effect, that drive the dynam-
ic in the social system in the long run. In such cases, the aggregation 
mechanism is an endogenous component of the model. While the iterated 
interaction of the agents is a characteristic design element of simulations, 
the resulting collective pattern is an emergent consequence thereof. In 
such cases, the process can be reconstructed as a series of iterated and 
nested Coleman’s Bathtubs. 
7) Finally, if successful, the simulation provides an explanation of the phe-
nomenon of interest by uncovering a set of conditions in the model that is 
sufficient to generate an aggregate pattern corresponding to the target 
phenomenon.3 Explaining by means of an agent-based model hence im-
plies uncovering the mechanisms that drive the dynamics of a social sys-
tem over time. As Squazzoni puts it: According to the social simulation 
approach, explaining means generating, that is, specifying and showing 
the generative process through which interacting agents in a given envi-
ronment combine to produce the macro-regularity of interest (Squazzoni 
                                                             
3  Not all agent-based simulations aim to explain social phenomena. Some agent-based mod-
els are used to test the coherence of theoretical frameworks (Gavin 2018) or gain under-
standing of certain mechanisms and their interplay. See also the discussion in the following 
section.  
HSR 43 (2018) 1  │  15 
2008, 5). The explanations afforded by agent-based models therefore fall 
into a special class of social explanations, for which Stegmüller coined 
the term “historically genetic explanations” (Stegmüller 1983). 
There are two additional characteristic features of agent-based models to dis-
cuss. The first is that designing an agent-based simulation forces the modeler to 
be explicit about her design choices. Coding a model into a computer requires 
the researcher to specify all assumptions used in detail and to express all pa-
rameters and mechanisms employed within a highly precise formal framework. 
As a consequence, scientific arguments employing agent-based models tend to 
be comparatively explicit about their underlying assumptions and their exact 
scope. This arguably facilitates debates and comparisons between different 
approaches, as exemplified by Fernández Pinto and Fernández Pinto (2018) 
and Holman et al. (2018) in this volume. Moreover, the degree of precision that 
is required renders the task of transforming an informally described argument 
or theory into a formal model a non-trivial endeavor. In the process of transla-
tion, the modeler may encounter relevant aspects that are not sufficiently speci-
fied by the original theory, for instance, about the exact learning rules em-
ployed by agents in iterated games. Filling in these gaps may require 
substantial modeling choices. This has a variety of implications about learning 
from an agent-based model. On the one hand, the necessity to make modeling 
choices implies that the target theory cannot be tested in isolation, but only in 
conjunction with the choices made. On the other hand, the process of transla-
tion could be instructive: the attempt to transform an informal argument into a 
formal model may reveal hidden assumptions or gaps in an argument that had 
previously gone unnoticed. See Baumgaertner (2018) for an example.  
Second, agent-based simulations in the humanities and the social sciences 
frequently share a further aspect: they are highly abstract representations of 
their target system.4 Models distort their target systems in various possible 
ways. The most uncontroversial of these are Aristotelian idealizations (Weis-
berg 2007; Frigg and Hartmann 2006), sometimes also called abstractions 
(Cartwright 1989). Models frequently strip away aspects of the target system 
that are irrelevant for the modeling goal, such as the nationality of agents or 
their precise identity. This type of idealization is typically considered unprob-
lematic. More controversial is a second type of distortion: Galilean idealiza-
tions, which omit, distort, or misrepresent aspects of the target system that are 
relevant to the phenomenon studied. In this special issue, for instance, Schmitt 
and Franzmann (2018) put forward a model on the strategic positioning of 
parties that completely abstracts away from any mobility restrictions parties 
                                                             
4  Within certain parts of the social science, also large classes of highly complex, less abstract 
models can be found. For the present purpose, however, we restrict ourselves to highly ab-
stract models as prevail in the humanities.  
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might face, derived for instance from their members’ individual policy interests 
or considerations of long-term credibility. Even more to the extreme, 
De Langhe (2018) presents a model of the dynamic of scientific paradigms that 
omits almost any aspect of scientific theories such as predictive power, simplic-
ity, fit to data, or even the very concept of a subject of science. It is such Gali-
lean idealizations that pose serious puzzles as to what can be learned from 
highly abstract models, and how. While less abstract models might be evaluat-
ed by their fit to the data or the quality of their predictions (Friedman 1953), no 
such mechanism is available here. We return to the topic of validity in the next 
section. 
3.  Models and Validity 
While agent-based models share many similarities, they differ widely in, for 
instance, the (a) type of target system addressed, (b) intended modeling goals, 
and (c) degrees of abstraction. 
a) Let us begin by examining the types of target systems addressed in this 
special issue. Some of the models presented relate to singular events. 
Ewert and Sunder (2018), for example, aim to explain why a particular 
phenomenon, medieval sea trade in the Baltic region, developed as it 
did. Others address general classes of phenomena, such as the for-
mation of centrist coalition governments (Schmitt and Franzmann 
2018) or the editing history of Wikipedia articles (Rudas and Török 
2018). Still other models relate not to any target system in the real 
world, but to counterfactual situations describing how the world might 
have been but is not. This, again, is reflected briefly in Ewert and Sun-
der (2018), who discuss why medieval trade in the Mediterranean re-
gion did not develop kinship network patterns similar to its Baltic coun-
terpart. 
A further class of models is aimed not at social phenomena directly, but 
rather at preexisting theoretical accounts of social phenomena. Such in-
formal theories may claim that some macroscopic phenomenon derives 
from certain individual actions or that some types of behavior uniformly 
lead to certain desirable outcomes. Here, agent-based models can pro-
vide a consistency check. By encoding the informally offered assump-
tions (e.g., on human behavior) into an agent-based simulation, one can 
test whether the proclaimed mechanism can actually generate the phe-
nomenon of interest. Along these lines, De Langhe (2018) examines 
whether the progression of scientific paradigms described in Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) emerges within a 
society of self-interested strategic scientists. Gavin (2018) uses agent-
based models to determine whether two different theoretical approaches 
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stemming from the two main works of Adam Smith are compatible and 
whether additional phenomena occur at their points of interplay. 
The process of translating an informal theory into a formal simulation 
is, notably, far from automatic. Within this process, the modeler may 
stumble across mechanisms that determine the agents’ movements or 
learning speeds, or parameters that need to be controlled, yet have not 
been included or sufficiently specified in the original theory. Baum-
gaertner (2018), for instance, assesses John Stuart Mill’s famous argu-
ment for opinion diversity in light of recent works on belief polariza-
tion. A central parameter for the latter is the agents’ homophily. 
Baumgaertner examines whether empirically plausible levels of this pa-
rameter are such that Mill’s argument remains sound.  
b) A second major dimension is the type of modeling goal pursued. Here, 
too, there can be substantial differences. Some models aim at explana-
tions of a macro-level phenomenon, the explanandum. The goal is to 
identify as explanans a certain set of micro-level entities, together with 
mechanisms, parameters, and interaction rules that jointly generate the 
target phenomenon in question, as the simulation is to prove. Model 
behavior is, in general, indeterminate and may exhibit path dependency. 
Hence, there are several possible outcomes of a simulation. A certain 
set of input parameters may always create a certain target phenomenon: 
it may usually create that phenomenon; or the simulation may merely 
show that the target phenomenon might possibly arise in the given 
model setting. Depending on the nature of the target phenomenon as 
well as the explanatory standards applied, either of these could qualify 
as an explanation. Ewert and Sunder (2018), for instance, assess ex-
planatory power in their approach to medieval trade in the Baltics by 
considering average performance over a large number of model runs, 
while Klein and Marx (2018) merely show that certain self-enforcing 
bubbles of distrust might occur under low mobilities.  
Closely connected to explanation is the goal of prediction. Here, an 
agent-based model is to be used for predicting how the world will be or 
how potential choices or policy decisions translate into future states. 
Within the social sciences, such predictive use of models can be found, 
for instance, in the field of urban planning (Waddell 2002). This plays 
less of a role in the current special issue. None of the models presented 
here aim at detailed qualitative predictions. However, some are targeted 
or could serve to inform policy decisions, at least over the long run. 
Borg et al. (2018), for instance, study whether communication among 
scientists impedes or fosters the overall progress of science. As their 
model is highly abstract, it allows for qualitative predictions at best. Yet 
even qualitative answers can be used in discussing the ideal institution-
al setup of science. The same is true for Rudas and Török (2018), who 
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study the impact of banning policies on the convergence of Wikipedia 
articles subjected to competing editing.  
Still other models aim at verstehen, or enhancing the understanding of 
some mechanism’s workings and effects. Take Klein and Marx’s 
(2018) model on the emergence of generalized trust. The authors aim to 
understand one particular mechanism that plays a role in regulating 
whether agents are willing to trust hitherto unknown others: the mecha-
nism of learning through direct, first-hand experience. While the model 
studies how certain parameters such as the agents’ initial trust level or 
their mobility affect the dynamics of general trust, it explicitly omits a 
variety of relevant other factors. It does so to study direct experiences 
of trust and trustworthiness and their long-term effects in isolation. In 
particular, the model does not embed its agents in any type of social 
circles from which they could learn or where they could share their in-
formation. In real life, such indirect sources of information are arguably 
at least as relevant for the agents’ propensity to trust as is their direct 
experience. The model hence can hardly generate any valid predictions, 
nor does it aim to do so. Rather, it aims to generate understanding of 
one particular mechanism that in reality is always conjoined with oth-
ers. Similar considerations hold for De Langhe’s model of Kuhnian sci-
entific paradigms (2018), in which the scientific properties of a para-
digm play no role, or for Holman et al.’s account of collaborative 
problem solving (2018).  
Along a similar line, other models aim to create understanding of the 
interplay among various mechanisms. Rather than addressing a particu-
lar social phenomenon, such models seek to increase our understanding 
of how different well-known mechanisms interact. Scheller (2018), for 
instance, studies the interplay between deliberative decision making 
and voting in terms of expected accuracy and the average time it takes 
to reach a decision. Taken individually, both deliberation and voting are 
understood sufficiently well. Scheller, however, shows that this alone is 
not sufficient to understand complex collective decision making. By 
means of an agent-based model, he reveals that the interplay of both 
mechanisms gives rise to complex patterns that could hardly have been 
anticipated by addressing either mechanism in isolation. 
c) The third relevant aspect is how agent-based models relate to their re-
spective target systems. This aspect covers how similar model and tar-
get phenomenon are to each other, what aspects of the target phenome-
non are included in the model and, crucially, how the model affords 
new insights about the target phenomenon in question. This topic is 
closely related to validation, that is, the question of how a model can be 
identified as correct, broadly speaking. Gräbner (2017, 6) and 
Tesfatsion (2017, 14) identify different forms of model verification and 
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validation: the input parameters might be calibrated to available data 
(input validation); the modeler might provide arguments for the mecha-
nisms encoded (process validation) and check the internal consistency 
of the model (model verification); the output might be calibrated 
against training data (descriptive output validation); and, finally, the 
model might be judged by the accuracy of its predictions for new data 
points (prescriptive output validation). It is an open question dating 
back at least to Friedman (1953) as to whether any subset of these is 
necessary or sufficient for model validity.  
Some of these conditions, however, may be of limited applicability to a large 
class of agent-based models in philosophy and the social sciences. All the 
models developed in this special issue qualify as what are sometimes called 
“toy models”: extremely simplified, highly abstract representations of a target 
system that possibly include a number of Galilean idealizations (Grüne-Yanoff 
2009). With such models, quantitative point predictions are, in general, neither 
possible nor intended.  
How, then, can we learn from such models? For one, other dimensions of 
validation still apply. When models cannot be compared by their accuracy or 
predictive power, it becomes even more crucial to justify the model mechanism 
by reference to the target phenomenon. Such justifications can be found in all 
the contributions to this special issue. Yet, providing justifications for the 
mechanisms included may not be sufficient. After all, toy models are highly 
idealized, omitting a variety of relevant factors and mechanisms. The risk, here, 
is that the result is driven or distorted precisely by what is not included, thus 
undermining the use of the simulation results for understanding the target phe-
nomenon. This worry is reflected in, for instance, the contribution of Borg et al. 
(2018), who argue that previous models of communication in science omit 
relevant aspects of the scientific process, leading them to false conclusions.  
Even within highly idealized models, some argument needs to be given for 
the value range of parameters included. There are two main strategies for doing 
so. The first is to cite empirical or theoretical evidence that justifies the choice 
of parameter values. In the present issue, this is done by Mayerhoffer (2018), 
who calibrates his discussion of tolerance dynamics among adolescents with 
empirical data. Similarly, Holman et al. (2018) base their criticism of the Hong 
and Page (2004) model on the claim that the latter misestimates the values of 
relevant parameters. The second strategy applies when empirical information 
about parameter values is lacking or incomplete. In this case, the modeler may 
resort to something akin to an existential quantification. They could show that 
the target phenomenon in question occurs under a large range of input parame-
ters, broad enough to contain plausibly the unknown real values.  
This second strategy is tightly connected to the topic of robustness. If the 
qualitative outcomes of a model are robust under changes in the model parame-
ters, variations in the mechanisms incorporated, and the exact implementation 
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of the model, these are generally taken as evidence of the model’s validity. In 
this case, the micro-specifications in question are said to satisfy the criterion of 
“generative sufficiency” (Epstein and Axtell 1996, 6) with regard to the macro-
regularity of interest.  
A further relevant aspect in determining what can be learned from toy mod-
els is the distinction between “how-possible” and “how-actual” understanding, 
introduced by Reutlinger et al. (2017). In brief, the latter is about determining 
which mechanism drives a result in the actual world. How-possible understand-
ing, in contrast, merely aims at identifying plausible mechanisms and showing 
that they are sufficient to produce the target phenomenon, without necessarily 
claiming that they are at work in the actual world. Having such how-possible 
understanding hence helps in charting the territory of possible mechanisms. It 
provides the modeler, at least, with additional insights about the connections 
between certain structural factors and mechanisms relevant to the target phe-
nomenon. The highly idealized nature of toy models arguably squares well with 
the concept of how-possible understanding. Toy models, sometimes also re-
ferred to as “minimal idealizations” (Weisberg 2007), include only the bare 
minimum of mechanisms needed to create a desired output. On the one hand, 
this highly abstract nature makes it difficult to determine whether some real-
world counterpart of the model mechanism drives the target phenomenon, that 
is, whether we acquire “how-actual” understanding. On the other hand, onto-
logical sparseness facilitates determining how parameters and factors drive the 
target phenomenon in the model. In other words, it is exactly the ontological 
sparseness of toy models that allows the modeler to gain a high degree of un-
derstanding of the mechanisms involved, and hence affords “how-possible” 
understanding of the target system.  
Finally, we point to a further way of learning from toy models: multiple 
model idealizations (Weisberg 2007). While every model simplifies and dis-
torts the target system, different models will, in general, differ as to which 
factors to include. If a variety of models agree in some predictions they make, 
it should hence give greater credence to the idea that the phenomenon is real 
rather than an artifact of our modeling choices. This point is acknowledged by 
various contributions in this issue. In particular, Fernández Pinto and Fernán-
dez Pinto (2018) argue that replicating a classic model on epistemic landscapes 
in a different simulation environment and with slightly adapted decision rules 
lends additional reliability to the original results. 
4. Conclusion  
The twelve papers in this HSR Special Issue address the trends in agent-based 
modeling research just described. They cover classical simulation topics such 
as opinion dynamics, voting behavior, the formation of trust, and the social 
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makeup of science, but provide a fresh perspective. Others put forward novel 
approaches to problems that have so far had little contact with agent-based 
models, such as medieval history of trade or Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill 
scholarship.  
All the papers selected share some common characteristics that are, in our 
minds, typical for agent-based models. We have elaborated on these shared 
characteristics in Section 2, where we discussed common features in agent-
based modeling using Coleman’s Bathtub as a theoretical framework. In Sec-
tion 3, we then offered a theoretical apparatus to categorize relevant differences 
between various agent-based models with respect to the quality of their target 
systems, intended modeling goals, and the degrees of abstraction of the models. 
Within our discussion, we have already pointed out selected aspects of each 
contribution. We conclude by providing brief summaries of all twelve papers 
included in this issue. 
Rogier De Langhe presents “An Agent-Based Model of Thomas Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions.” He shows that the patterns of normal sci-
ence and scientific revolutions, and the corresponding succession of paradigms 
described by Kuhn, can emerge naturally within a society of strategic, self-
interested scientists. By translating Kuhn’s ideas into an agent-based model, he 
shows how mechanisms of self-organization can endogenously generate domi-
nant paradigms, thereby providing additional support to Kuhn’s analysis of the 
progress of science. 
Manuela Fernández Pinto and Daniel Fernández Pinto criticize in “Epis-
temic Landscapes Reloaded: An Examination of Agent-Based Models in Social 
Epistemology” Weisberg and Muldoon’s epistemic landscape model (Weisberg 
and Muldoon 2009). This highly abstract model studies the effects of mixing 
different types of scientist personalities, mavericks and followers, on the long-
term success of science. Fernández Pinto and Fernández Pinto challenge the 
finding of the epistemic landscape model by showing that small changes in the 
rules determining the behavior of follower-type agents can lead to significant 
changes in simulation results. They go further to argue that the epistemic land-
scape model results are robust with respect to the computing mechanism, but 
not necessarily across agent realizations. Finally, they conclude by offering 
some thoughts on what this implies for general lessons drawn from this class of 
models. 
Csilla Rudas and János Török address consensus-building processes in their 
paper on “Modeling the Wikipedia to Understand the Dynamics of Long Dis-
putes and Biased Articles.” Their analysis focuses on the dynamics of Wikipe-
dia articles that are subjected to competing revisions by several editors, each 
with their own perspective on the matter. By means of an agent-based model, 
Rudas and Török study how the attitudes of editors affect the consensus-
building process. They show that in most cases banning extreme agents from 
editing an article slows down the consensus-building process. Somewhat coun-
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terintuitively, they also find that having large groups of extremists who hold 
opinions far of the center accelerates the consensus-building process and leads 
to articles that are less biased. 
Simon Scheller examines the claim that democratic decision making has an 
intrinsic epistemic value in “When Do Groups Get It Right? On the Epistemic 
Performance of Voting and Deliberation.” The author presents an agent-based 
model that combines the two main modes of collective decision making: delib-
eration and voting. Under the assumption that there is an objective fact of the 
matter, the paper studies the circumstances under which groups are able to 
identify reliably the “correct alternative.” The research scrutinizes the perfor-
mance of groups under varying conditions on both, communication behavior 
and voting thresholds. Simulation results show that larger majority require-
ments in voting can increase expected adequacy in well-functioning groups, but 
can also award a veto power to closed-minded individuals. Further, the author 
concludes that when independent information acquisition is possible, reasona-
ble skepticism regarding other people’s opinions can provide a useful impedi-
ment against overly quick convergence on a false consensus. 
Ulf Christian Ewert and Marco Sunder, in “Modelling Maritime Trade Sys-
tems: Agent-Based Simulation and Medieval History,” adopt a fresh perspec-
tive on the medieval history of trade in the Baltic. In particular, they engage in 
an ongoing debate on the causes of both the formation of the Hanse’s kinship 
network-based system of trade in Northern Europe and its later dissolution. 
They do so by applying a multi-agent model to the analysis. In addition to 
connecting their findings to ongoing discussions in institutional economics and 
economic history, the authors address the prospects and limitations of using 
agent-based simulation in historical research.  
Daniel Mayerhoffer models adolescents in their formation of attitudes to-
wards topics of sexual diversity. In “Raising Children to Be (In-)Tolerant” he 
shows that civil society has a strong impact on the level of tolerance these 
develop, while the church and state run educational institutions only have mi-
nor bearing. The agent-based model Mayerhoffer constructs is based on exten-
sive survey data on the environments and attitudes of adolescents in Germany. 
In “A Polarizing Dynamic by Center Cabinets? The Mechanism of Limited 
Contestation,” Johannes Schmitt and Simon Franzmann analyze how patterns 
of government formation influence the polarization of party systems. By means 
of an agent-based simulation, they reveal the mechanisms that drive a polity to 
extremes. Their model focuses on the effects on polarization in party systems 
where the governing coalition is one of the ideological center. 
In his paper on “Models of Opinion Dynamics and Mill-Style Arguments for 
Opinion Diversity,” Bert Baumgaertner demonstrates how models of opinion 
dynamics can help us gain a better understanding of John Stuart Mill’s argu-
ment for opinion diversity. He contrasts Mill’s original argument with recent 
work on belief polarization driven by homophily, the tendency to preferably 
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interact with like-minded individuals. Baumgaertner’s findings show that real-
istic levels of homophily do not sufficiently explain decreased opinion diversi-
ty. The results provide insights into how arguments such as Mill’s depend on 
hidden assumptions about the psychology and sociality of individuals. The 
results, thereby, increase our understanding of such arguments by bringing 
underlying assumptions out into the open, but also by restricting the scope of 
validity of said arguments. 
Dominik Klein and Johannes Marx contribute with “Generalized Trust in the 
Mirror An Agent-Based Model on the Dynamics of Trust” to the debate about 
trust in larger societies. Generalized trust – the propensity to place trust in 
strangers – has attracted much attention in political science lately, as it has been 
identified as a central determinant for the economic and political success of 
modern states. In their analysis, the authors focus on understudied micro-level 
processes that determine the emergence and stability of generalized trust. They 
investigate conditions under which trust is likely to emerge and be sustained 
over an extended period. In contrast to predictions from the literature, Klein 
and Marx find that low degrees of geographic and social mobility are detri-
mental to both the emergence and stability of trust. They also identify a hidden, 
emergent link between trusting others and being trustworthy. 
In “Diversity and Democracy: Agent-Based Modeling in Political Philoso-
phy,” Bennett Holman, William J. Berger, Daniel J. Singer, Patrick Grim and 
Aaron Bramson challenge the results of a highly cited paper by Hong and Page 
(2004) on the performance of epistemic groups. While Hong and Page con-
clude that diversity, rather than individual abilities, is the main driver of group 
competence, Holman et al. argue that some of their model’s basic assumptions 
are due to misidentifications and the erroneous conceptualization of expertise. 
They argue that correct modeling leads to different results. Furthermore, the 
authors demonstrate how sensitive the finding is to changes in parameters and 
provide an analysis of when diversity trumps ability in terms of group perfor-
mance. 
AnneMarie Borg, Daniel Frey, Dunja Šešelja, and Christian Straßer inves-
tigate “Epistemic Effects of Scientific Interaction: Approaching the Question 
with an Argumentative Agent-Based Model”. Their research contributes to a 
lively debate over whether increased communication among scientists is bene-
ficial or harmful to the overall success of science. The authors argue that a 
variety of existing models on this question misrepresent or omit crucial aspects 
and parameters. On this basis, they call into question the relevance of some of 
these results for actual scientific practice. The authors then present a novel 
agent-based model that represents scientific interaction in terms of discovering 
and exchanging arguments for and against scientific theories. This allows them 
to propose novel hypotheses and assess the robustness of previously obtained 
results under different modeling choices. 
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In “An Agent-Based Computational Approach to ‘The Adam Smith Prob-
lem,’” Michael Gavin addresses the longstanding observation that the two main 
works of Adam Smith rest on seemingly contradictory assumptions about hu-
man nature: that we are self-interested, or that we are guided by social norms 
and a concern for others. By applying two agent-based models, Gavin demon-
strates how both assumptions may be compatible with each other, after all. 
Moreover, he shows that the interplay between both factors entails significant 
consequences that Smith himself may have not anticipated. The author derives 
four propositions from his analysis, two of which offer a new perspective on 
the Adam Smith Problem. Here, the use of agent-based modeling may well be 
the starting point for a newly energized debate on a classic theme. 
All contributions in this HSR Special Issue have gone through a thorough 
double-blind peer review process. We would like to thank the editors and the 
editorial office of the journal for giving us the opportunity to edit this issue, 
and for their support. We would also like to thank the numerous reviewers for 
their thorough and extremely helpful comments. And finally, of course, we’d 
like to thank all the authors who contributed to this special issue. 
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